Credit Supply, Firms, and Earnings Inequality by Moser, Christian et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Credit Supply, Firms, and Earnings
Inequality
Moser, Christian and Saidi, Farzad and Wirth, Benjamin
and Wolter, Stefanie
12 May 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/100371/
MPRA Paper No. 100371, posted 15 May 2020 05:09 UTC
Credit Supply, Firms, and Earnings Inequality∗
Christian Moser† Farzad Saidi‡ Benjamin Wirth§ Stefanie Wolter¶
May 12, 2020
Abstract
We study the distributional effects of a monetary policy-induced firm-level credit supply
shock on individual wages and employment. To this end, we construct a novel dataset that
links worker employment histories to firms’ bank credit relationships in Germany. We doc-
ument that firms in relationships with banks that were more exposed to negative monetary
policy rates in 2014 see a relative reduction in credit supply. A negative credit supply shock
in turn is associated with lower firm-level average wages and employment. These effects are
concentrated among distinct worker groups within firms, with initially lower-paid workers
more likely to be fired and initially higher-paid workers more likely to receive wage cuts. At
the same time, wages decline by more at initially higher-paying firms. Consequently, wage
inequality within and between firms decreases. Our results suggest that monetary policy has
important distributional effects in the labor market.
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1 Introduction
A salient characteristic of many labor markets is that seemingly identical workers receive sub-
stantial differences in pay across employers. Motivated by this observation, a burgeoning litera-
ture has explored the contribution of employer heterogeneity toward empirical pay dispersion.1
A recent strand of this literature has linked changes in the earnings distribution to the evolu-
tion of within- and between-employer pay differences over time.2 Yet the fundamental drivers of
(changes in) within- and between-employer pay differences remain scarcely understood.
Given the limited ability of worker attributes related to labor supply to account for empirical
pay dispersion, a natural explanation pertains to firm-specific labor demand. In theory, differences
in labor demand across firms in a frictional labor market can give rise to wage dispersion for
identical workers—a deviation from the law of one price in competitive labor markets. In practice,
however, the labor demand channel of firm pay heterogeneity is hard to pinpoint empirically due
to two challenges. First, measures of firm pay may be confounded by worker composition that is
undetectable absent individual-level panel data. Second, the effect of firm-specific labor demand
on pay is difficult to disentangle from competing explanations, such as heterogeneity in labor
supply curves, absent identified variation in labor demand.3
In this paper, we study the wage and employment effects of changes in labor demand due to
a firm-level credit supply shock. In doing so, we address the two aforementioned empirical chal-
lenges. Specifically, we construct a novel dataset that links worker employment histories to firms’
bank credit relationships in Germany. We exploit the introduction of negative monetary policy
rates by the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2014 as a source of variation in credit supply. We
show that firms in preexisting relationships with banks that were more exposed to negative rates
see a relative reduction in credit. Lower credit in turn is associated with lower firm-level aver-
age wages and employment. These effects are concentrated among distinct worker groups within
firms, with initially lower-paid workers more likely to be fired and initially higher-paid workers
more likely to receive wage cuts. At the same time, wages decline by more at initially high-paying
firms. Consequently, wage inequality within and between firms decreases. In summary, we find
that a monetary policy-induced firm-level credit supply shock affects the distribution of pay and
employment, consistent with the labor demand channel in a frictional labor market.
1See the literature survey contained in Card et al. (2018).
2See Card et al. (2013) for Germany, Alvarez et al. (2018) for Brazil, and Song et al. (2019) for the U.S.
3Firms could face heterogeneous labor supply curves due to, for example, local labor market concentration (Berger
et al., 2019; Hershbein et al., 2020) or the presence of job amenities (Sorkin, 2018).
2
To guide our empirical investigation, we develop a simple equilibrium model of firm credit in
a frictional labor market. We extend the seminal framework by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to
include worker heterogeneity in skills and firm heterogeneity in credit constraints. Firms of dif-
ferent productivities debt-finance their operating costs subject to firm-specific borrowing limits.
Firms’ labor demand depends on their productivity and the tightness of their credit constraint. A
tightening of a firm’s credit constraint reduces labor demand, leading to lower wages and employ-
ment for both high-skill and low-skill workers. If wages are relatively rigid for low-skill workers,
for example due to a binding wage floor, then credit tightening causes the wages of high-skill
workers to decline more than those of low-skill workers, thereby reducing wage inequality.
Motivated by these model predictions, we study the effect of a monetary policy-induced firm-
level credit supply shock on individual wages and employment in the data. To identify firm-level
variation in credit supply, our empirical strategy extends Heider et al. (2019), which highlights
the transmission of negative rates through banks’ funding structure. Their identification revolves
around the idea that banks are reluctant, or unable, to pass on negative rates to their depositors.
This rationalizes our focus on the introduction of negative rates as a shock to banks’ funding
cost and associated lending capacity, which manifests itself as a negative credit supply shock for
firms in sticky relationships with those banks. Banks with greater reliance on deposit funding
experience relatively higher funding costs due to negative rates, which leads to a larger reduction
in lending by those banks. Our empirical investigation exploits this variation in two stages.
In the first stage of our empirical investigation, we show that German firms in preexisting
relationships with high-deposit banks experience a negative credit supply shock due to the intro-
duction of negative rates. More affected firms see significant reductions in credit, both along the
extensivemargin—receiving any loan—and along the intensivemargin—total loan volume. These
results are robust to controlling for bank-firmmatch-specific and time-varying bank-specific unob-
served heterogeneity, which subsumes aggregate economic conditions and banks’ financial health
during this period. Our findings also suggest that more affected firms reduce their leverage, as
they are unable to fully substitute credit by switching banks or accessing debt capital markets.
In the second stage of our empirical investigation, we study the effect of this firm-level credit
supply shock on individual wages and employment. To this end, we exploit the granularity of
the German linked employer-employee data merged with information on firms’ banking relation-
ships. In line with our model predictions, we find that the credit contraction due to the introduc-
tion of negative monetary policy rates leads to lower firm-level average wages and employment.
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A one standard deviation increase in exposure to the negative credit supply shock is associated
with a significant reduction in mean wages of up to 1.2 percent, and a significant increase in layoff
risk of up to 0.2 percentage points. These estimates control for worker-firm match-specific het-
erogeneity and aggregate time trends. Absent individual-level micro data, these effects would be
confounded by changes in workforce composition due to worker turnover.
The estimated mean effects of the negative credit supply shock on wages and employment
mask important heterogeneity across worker groups within firms. To shed light on this hetero-
geneity, we estimate individual wage equations with controls for worker-firm match-specific and
time-varying firm pay components. We find that initially lower-paid workers are more likely to
be fired, while initially higher-paid workers are more likely to receive wage cuts. A one standard
deviation increase in exposure to the negative credit supply shock is associated with a significant
reduction in top-quintile wages of around 0.8 percent relative to workers in the bottom quintile.
At the same time, layoff risk for bottom-quintile workers increases significantly by around 0.2
percentage points per standard deviation of exposure relative to workers in the top quintile. Con-
sequently, within-firm wage inequality decreases.
We also find important effects of the negative credit supply shock on the distribution of wages
between firms. To demonstrate this, we estimate a specification including an interaction term with
a firm’s initial pay rank in addition to controls for worker-firm match-specific heterogeneity and
aggregate time trends. Our estimates suggest that wages decline more at initially higher-paying
firms, with wage cuts at top-ranked firms being up to 14 percent greater than at bottom-ranked
firms. Consequently, between-firm inequality decreases.
In summary, our empirical analysis yields two novel insights. Our first insight is that a mon-
etary policy-induced firm-level credit supply shock affects wages as well as employment. This
finding is hard to reconcile with models featuring competitive labor markets, which predict that
workers’ wages equal their marginal product regardless of their employer’s idiosyncratic credit
constraints.4 Our second insight is that monetary policy, through its effect on credit supply, has
important distributional consequences in the labor market. In contrast, traditional models and
empirical studies of monetary policy focus on its effect on the level—i.e., the first moment—of
output, employment, and prices.5 Both of these insights are consistent with the labor demand
channel of firm pay heterogeneity, which lies at the heart of our simple equilibrium model.
4See Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Moll (2014), and Kiyotaki and Moore (2019) for examples of such models.
5See Bernanke et al. (1999), Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007), or Gertler and Karadi (2011).
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Related Literature. Ourwork relates to three strands of the literature. The first strand of the liter-
ature studies pay dispersion within and between firms. Motivated by the fact that observationally
identical individuals receive large differences in pay across industries (Dickens and Katz, 1987;
Krueger and Summers, 1988), numerous studies have highlighted the role of employer hetero-
geneity in explaining empirical wage dispersion. Abowd et al. (1999) develop and apply to French
administrative data a two-way fixed effects model, which simultaneously controls for unobserved
worker and firm heterogeneity. Since then, robust evidence of employer pay heterogeneity has
been found in several countries.6 Our findings contribute to this literature by shedding light on
the fundamental drivers of within- and between-firm pay differences. To the extent that Germany
has seen an increase in credit supply over the past four decades, our findings suggest that changes
in firm-level labor demand could explain part of the rise in wage inequality documented over this
period (Dustmann et al., 2009; Card et al., 2013).
The existence of firm pay differences for identical workers poses a challenge to models with
competitive labor markets, in which the law of one price holds. To rationalize these differences, a
large theoretical literature in the tradition of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) has developed equilib-
rium models of frictional labor markets, which have inspired empirical work by Manning (2003,
2011), among others.7 In these frictional models, firm pay differences arise due to heterogeneity
in labor demand based on productivity differences. The labor demand channel is also central to
understanding equilibrium unemployment over the business cycle (Shimer, 2005) and the impact
of policies such as unemployment insurance (Hagedorn et al., 2019). Few papers consider the role
of firm credit in determining employment and pay through the labor demand channel in a fric-
tional labor market. In this regard, closest to our theoretical framework are those by Wasmer and
Weil (2004) and Kehoe et al. (2019, 2020). Like them, we introduce credit frictions into a search-
and-matching environment. Unlike them, we model multi-worker firms that post (rather than
bargain) wages and vacancies, which allows us to study the effect of credit supply on within- and
between-firm differences in pay and employment.
The second strand of literature related to our work concerns the empirical observation that
employers imperfectly insure workers against idiosyncratic shocks. Guiso et al. (2005) estimate
positive pass-through of permanent firm-level productivity shocks to workers in Italy on average,
6These include, among others, Italy (Iranzo et al., 2008), the U.K. (Faggio et al., 2010), Germany (Card et al., 2013),
Brazil (Alvarez et al., 2018), Mexico (Frías et al., 2018), Portugal (Card et al., 2016), Sweden (Håkanson et al., forthcom-
ing), and the U.S. (Barth et al., 2016; Sorkin, 2018; Babina et al., 2019; Song et al., 2019).
7See Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Cahuc et al. (2006), Meghir et al. (2015), Hornstein et al. (2011), Engbom and
Moser (2018), Bagger and Lentz (2018), and Heise and Porzio (2019) for recent examples.
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and more so to managers. Fagereng et al. (2018) find greater pass-through of productivity shocks
to workers with higher wealth. Several other studies have focused on pass-through of shocks to
productivity8 and innovation.9 A novel aspect of our work is our focus on pass-through of firm-
level shocks to credit supply. Our estimates are consistent with previous work in that we find
positivewage sensitivity to credit supply and greater sensitivity among higher-rankedworkers. In
relatedwork, Guiso et al. (2013) document that regional credit market development affects starting
wages and wage growth of new hires. Our work complements theirs by demonstrating that firm-
level shocks to credit supply have differential effects on wages and employment throughout the
within- and between-firm distribution.
The third strand of literature related to our work concerns the effects of monetary policy and
credit supply on the real economy. A long tradition in macroeconomics has been concerned with
the credit channel of monetary policy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010),
which posits that monetary policy and financial frictions interact in shaping aggregate output,
employment, and prices. Credit supply is a key pillar of this theoretical transmission mechanism,
and has proved empirically relevant for several macroeconomic outcomes.10 Our work highlights
a different way in which monetary policy-induced credit supply affects the real economy: the
distribution of wages within and between firms. Prior studies have examined the effect of credit
on employment at the firm level (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Jiménez et al., 2017) and across skills
groups within firms (Berton et al., 2018; Barbosa et al., 2020). While it is clearly important to mea-
sure employment outcomes, as we do in our own analysis, understanding the effects of credit on
pay matters for the vast majority of workers who do not change employment status. Our paper is
among the first to identify firm credit as a source of wage inequality.11 A small number of concur-
rent papers measure the responsiveness of worker-level wages to firm-level credit shocks (Fonseca
and VanDoornik, 2019; Adamopoulou et al., 2020). A distinguishing feature of our work is that we
study the effects of a monetary policy shock, and that we focus on the distribution of wages within
and between firms. Thus, our results shed light on the distributional consequences of monetary
policy, which have been the subject of a new generation of empirically-oriented models.12
8See, for example, Friedrich et al. (2019), Lamadon et al. (2019), Engbom and Moser (2020), and Chan et al. (2020).
9See Van Reenen (1996), Kline et al. (2019), Aghion et al. (2019), Howell and Brown (2020), or Kogan et al. (2020).
10These include investment (Whited, 1992), total factor productivity (Gilchrist et al., 2013), employment (Chodorow-
Reich, 2014), innovation (Huber, 2018), and household demand (Mian et al., 2020).
11Previous studies by Romer and Romer (1999), Doepke and Schneider (2006), Rajan (2010), Kumhof et al. (2015), and
Coibion et al. (2017) have linked inequality to monetary policy and household credit.
12See Gornemann et al. (2016), McKay and Reis (2016), Kaplan et al. (2018), Debortoli and Galí (2018), Auclert (2019),
Bilbiie (2019), Ravn and Sterk (forthcoming), Acharya et al. (2020), Auclert et al. (2020), and Kekre and Lenel (2020). See
also Holm et al. (2020) for evidence on the transmission of monetary policy through the household portfolio channel.
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Outline. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops an equilibrium model
of firm credit in a frictional labor market. Section 3 outlines our empirical strategy. Section 4
discusses the data. Section 5 presents our empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 EquilibriumModel of Credit Supply and Wage Dispersion
The purpose of this simple model is to theoretically link credit supply to the distribution of wages
and employment. Motivated by the empirical observation that identical workers receive different
pay across firms in Germany (Card et al., 2013), we model the labor market as frictional as in
the seminal framework by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). We extend this framework to include
worker heterogeneity in skills and firm heterogeneity in credit constraints.
A mass 1 of workers and mass E of firms meet in a continuous-time frictional labor market.
2.1 Workers
Workers are infinitely lived, risk neutral, and discount the future at rate ρ. They differ in per-
manent skill a ∈ {aL, aH}. We assume 0 < aL < aH and refer to worker types as low-skill and
high-skill, with population shares µa. Workers find themselves either employed or unemployed.
Job search. Unemployed workers receive flow utility ba, with 0 < baL < baH , and engage in
random job search within labor markets segmented by worker type a. Search is random in the
sense that workers cannot direct their search to specific firms. Labor markets are segmented in the
sense that workers search for jobs in a market specific to their type, while firms post wages and
vacancies for each worker type. While employed, workers receive flow utility from their wage w
and engage in on-the-job search within their assigned labor market.
Unemployed workers receive job offers at endogenous rate λua and employed workers at rate
λea = s
e
aλ
u
a , where s
e
a is the relative on-the-job search intensity, which we assume is fixed and
satisfies seaL = 0 < s
e
aH
≤ 1. A job offer entails a wage w drawn from the distribution Fa(w), which
workers take as given but is determined endogenously through firms’ equilibrium decisions.
Jobs are terminated exogenously at rate δa, leaving workers unemployed. For low-skill em-
ployed workers, this is the only source of employment transitions. High-skill workers also sepa-
rate endogenously when offered a higher-wage job.
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Employer ranks. Workers rank jobs on a ladder according to their expected net present value
of wages. In equilibrium, low-skill workers draw wages from a degenerate offer distribution
concentrated on their reservationwage and cannot transition directly between jobs, as in Diamond
(1971). High-skill workers are mobile between jobs and rank employers according to their wage.
Value functions. The value of an employed worker of ability a in a job with wage w is
ρSa (w) = w+ λ
e
aH
∫
w′>w
[
SaH
(
w′
)
− SaH (w)
]
dFaH
(
w′
)
+ δaH [WaH − SaH (w)] , ∀a. (1)
The value of an unemployed worker of type a is
ρWa = baH + λ
u
aH
∫
w′
max
{
SaH
(
w′
)
−WaH , 0
}
dFaH
(
w′
)
, ∀a. (2)
Policy functions. Employed workers accept any job with a higher wage. Unemployed workers’
optimal job acceptance policies follow a threshold rule. Their reservation wage equals their flow
value of unemployment plus the forgone option value of receiving job offers while unemployed:
φa = ba + (λ
u
a − λ
e
a)
∫
w′≥φa
1− Fa (w′)
ρ + δa + λea [1− Fa (w
′)]
dw′, ∀a (3)
We assume that φaL and φaH are low enough so that all firms hire both skill types.
Unemployment. The steady-state unemployment rate for each worker type is
ua =
δa
δa + λua
, ∀a. (4)
Wage dispersion. Let κea = λ
e
a/δa govern the effective speed of workers climbing the job ladder.
The cross-sectional distribution of wages is Ga(w) = Fa(w)/[1+ κea[1− Fa(w)].
2.2 Firms
Firms differ in two dimensions: productivity p ∈ [p, p] ⊂ R++ and credit limit ξ ∈ [ξ, ξ] ⊂ R++.
We assume firm types j = (p, ξ) are distributed continuously according to Γ(j). With a slight
abuse of notation, we index firms, their productivity, and their credit limit by j.
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Wages and job vacancies. Firms post in each market a wage rate wa and job vacancies va subject
to flow cost ca(va), where ca(·) satisfies ca(0) = 0, ∂ca(0)/∂v = 0, and ∂ca(v)/∂v, ∂2ca(v)/∂v2 > 0
for all v > 0, and limv→+∞ ∂ca(v)/∂v = +∞.
Production. A firm with productivity pj employing {la}a∈{aL,aH} workers of each skill level pro-
duces output y(pj, {la}a∈{aL,aH}) = pj ∑a∈{aL,aH} ala.
Credit constraint. Firms take up debt D ∈ R+ to finance their operating costs before production
occurs, as in Christiano et al. (2005). Operating costs consist of the wage bill and recruiting costs,
so ∑a∈{aL,aH}[wala + ca(va)] ≤ D.
13 Firms take as given the exogenous interest rate r and face
idiosyncratic credit limits given by rD ≤ ξ j.
Value function. The value of a firm of type j = (pj, ξ j) is the net present value of revenues minus
the wage bill minus recruiting costs minus the cost of servicing debt, which can be written as
ρΠ (j) = max
{wa,va}a∈{aL ,aH}
{
∑
a∈{aL,aH}
[(
pja− (1+ r)wa
)
la(wa, va)− (1+ r)ca(va)
]}
(5)
s.t. r ∑
a∈{aL,aH}
[wala(wa, va) + ca (va)] ≤ ξ j
2.3 Matching and Firm Sizes
The effective mass of job searchers in market a equals
Ua = µa [ua + s
e
a(1− ua)] , ∀a. (6)
The mass of vacancies posted in market a across firm types j equals
Va = E
∫
j
va(j) dΓ(j), ∀a. (7)
A Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale combines the effective mass of
job searchers with the mass of job vacancies to produce, for each a, matches ma = χaVαa U
1−α
a , with
13An extension in which capital enters production andmust be financed upfront is straightforward and omitted here.
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matching efficiency χa > 0 and elasticity α ∈ (0, 1). Define labor market tightness as
θa =
Va
Ua
, ∀a. (8)
Job finding rates among the unemployed and the employed, and firms’ job filling rates are
λua = χaθ
α
a , λ
e
a = saλ
u
a , qa = χaθ
α−1
a , ∀a. (9)
The following Kolmogorov forward steady-state equation describes firms’ employment given
wage and vacancy policies (w, v), the offer distribution Fa(w), and market tightness θa:
la(w, v) =
(
1
δa + λea [1− Fa(w)]
)2 1
Va
µauaλ
u
a (δa + λ
e
a) v, ∀a (10)
2.4 Equilibrium Labor Demand
We define a stationary equilibrium of the economy in Appendix A.1. A firm’s equilibrium labor
demand manifests itself in two choice variables: a wage and a mass of vacancies for each worker
skill. Firms’ optimal wage and vacancy policies depend on their productivity but also take into
account the shadow cost of funds due to credit constraints as a function of their total wage bill
and recruiting costs. Firm optimality requires the following first-order conditions (FOCs) to hold:
[∂wa] : pja
∂la (wa, va)
∂wa
−
(
1+ (1+ ψj)r
) [
la (wa, va) + wa
∂la (wa, va)
∂wa
]
= 0, ∀a, (11)
[∂va] : pja
∂la (wa, va)
∂va
−
(
1+ (1+ ψj)r
) [
wa
∂la (wa, va)
∂va
+
∂ca (va)
∂va
]
= 0, ∀a, (12)
where ψj ≥ 0 is the shadow cost of resources associated with firm j’s credit constraint. For uncon-
strained firms, ψj = 0, while for credit constrained firms, ψj > 0. Consequently, constrained firms
offer lower wages and/or post fewer vacancies than they would if they were unconstrained.
The FOCs in equations (11) and (12) are identical to those of a firm with effective productivity
p˜j = pj
1+ r
1+ (1+ ψj)r
. (13)
Note that p˜j = pj for unconstrained firms with ψj = 0, and p˜j < pj for credit constrained firms
with ψj > 0. Firms facing a tighter credit constraint have lower effective productivity as they face
a higher shadow cost of resources.
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An argument analogous to that in Burdett andMortensen (1998) shows that equilibriumwages
are strictly increasing in effective productivity p˜j and the equilibrium offer distribution Fa(w) is
continuous and strictly increasing for w > max{pa , φa}. Therefore, firms find themselves ranked
on a ladder according to their effective productivity p˜j, which is an increasing function of their
productivity pj and the tightness of their credit constraint as measured by ψj.
Lemma 1 (Optimal wage policy). Optimal high-skill wages, waH , are strictly increasing in productivity
pj and strictly increasing (constant) in the credit limit ξ j for credit constrained (unconstrained) firms.
Optimal low-skill wages, waL , are constant and equal to their flow value of unemployment, baL .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is that the payoff from hiring are greater for more produc-
tive and less credit constrained firms. Since higher wages attract and retain high-skill workers,
they are increasing in productivity and in the credit limit for constrained firms. Low-productivity
workers’ wages are not allocative, so their wages are invariant to productivity and the credit limit.
Therefore, while low-skill workers wages respond one-for-one to their reservationwage, high-skill
workers are partly shielded from the value of nonemployment, as in Jäger et al. (forthcoming).
Lemma 2 (Optimal vacancy policy). Optimal low-skill vacancies, vaL , and high-skill vacancies, vaH ,
are strictly increasing in productivity pj and strictly increasing (constant) in the credit limit ξ j for credit
constrained (unconstrained) firms.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.2.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is that productivity and credit limits increase the payoff from
hiring. Since firms equate themarginal cost of vacancy posting to themarginal profit per contacted
worker, firms with higher productivity and higher credit limits post more vacancies.
Lemma 3 (Optimal employment). Optimal low-skill employment, laL , and high-skill employment, laH ,
are strictly increasing in productivity pj and strictly increasing (constant) in the credit limit ξ j for credit
constrained (unconstrained) firms.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3.
Lemma 3 follows logically from Lemmas 1 and 2 given the model’s job ladder structure, as
higher-wage firms poach more and lose fewer workers through job-to-job transitions, and higher-
vacancy firms recruit more workers from unemployment and from other firms. While the relative
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employment effect on high-skill versus low-skill workers is an empirical question, a natural hy-
pothesis is that employment responds more for low-skill jobs whose surplus is likely closer to
zero, as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
2.5 EquilibriumWage Dispersion within and between Firms
How do credit supply-induced changes in firms’ labor demand affect the distribution of wages
within and between firms? The following proposition compares firms across steady states of the
economy with different levels of credit supply.
Proposition 1 (Within- and between-firm inequality). A decrease in the credit limit ξ j for all j leads to
(a) lower within-firm inequality, measured by the top-to-bottom difference in wages within firms; and
(b) lower between-firm inequality, measured by the top-to-bottom difference in mean wages between
firms, holding fixed job offer arrival rates {λua ,λ
e
a} for both a.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.4.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. For part (a), if low-skill wages are relatively
more downward-rigid than high-skill wages are, then within-firm inequality is decreasing in the
tightness of the credit constraint. For part (b), if in addition worker firm-level composition does
not change toomuch, then also mean wages of firms initially at the top of the distribution decrease
by more than those at the bottom.14
While these model predictions are intuitive, what the wage and employment effects of credit
supply in the labor market are is ultimately an empirical question. In the next section, we test
these predictions empirically using an identified credit supply shock together with microdata on
worker employment histories and firms’ bank credit relationships in Germany.
3 Empirical Strategy
Guided by the predictions of the model from the previous section, our goal is to estimate the effect
of credit supply on the distribution of pay and employment within and between firms. Before
going into details of the specific empirical setting based on which we identify variation in credit
supply, it will be useful to spell out the general methodology that allows us to achieve our goal.
14A sufficient condition for the latter is that job offer arrival rates {λua ,λ
e
a} are fixed, although this is not strictly
necessary for the result to obtain.
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3.1 Measuring the Effects of Credit Supply within and between Firms
Consider a panel of workers indexed by i across firms indexed by j and years indexed by t. The
ideal experiment would involve tracing pay and employment of workers in the labor market fol-
lowing a credit supply shock to a known subset of firms. Let us denote such a shock to credit
supply at the level of the firm-year jt by Creditjt.
Mean effects. While the credit supply shock is at the firm-year level, we are interested in indi-
vidual pay and employment at the level of the worker-firm-year ijt. Our simplest specification
will be
yijt = βCreditjt + θij + δt + ε ijt, (14)
where yijt is an outcome for worker i at firm j in year t, Creditjt is the credit supply shock described
above, and θij and δt denote worker-firm and year fixed effects, respectively. The coefficient of
interest in equation (14) is β, whichmeasures the average response of yijt to variation inCreditjt. By
controlling for worker-firmmatch fixed effects, we identify this coefficient off the effect onworkers
that were already employed at the same firm prior to the credit supply shock. By additionally
controlling for year fixed effects, we absorb aggregate trends and business cycle fluctuations that
affect all workers equally.
Aside from the credit supply shock’s mean effect on workers, we are also interested in its
distributional effects. Specifically, we study the effect of credit on the distribution of worker-level
outcomes within and between firms.
Within-firm heterogeneity. To estimate within-firm heterogeneity in the effect of credit, we in-
teract the credit supply shock with a function of a worker’s pay rank within the firm:
yijt = β1Creditjt × RankWithini + β2Creditjt + β3RankWithini + θij + ηjt + ε ijt, (15)
where RankWithini is a function of worker i’s pay rank within firm j during a preperiod prior to
the credit supply shock, θij and ηjt denote worker-firm and firm-year fixed effects, respectively.
The coefficient of interest in equation (15) is β1, which measures the differential response of yijt
to variation in Creditjt throughout the within-firm pay distribution. As before, by controlling for
worker-firm match fixed effects, we identify this coefficient off the effect on workers that were al-
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ready employed at the same firm prior to the credit supply shock. In addition to the set of previous
controls, we also add a set of firm-year fixed effects that control for time-varying unobserved het-
erogeneity at the firm level that may govern firm-level movements in pay or employment. This
powerful control absorbs, among other things, aggregate trends and idiosyncratic firm innova-
tions, including productivity shocks and other factors that affect all workers within a given firm
equally.
Between-firm heterogeneity. To estimate between-firm heterogeneity in the effect of credit, we
interact the credit supply shock with a function of a firm’s mean pay rank:
yijt = β1Creditjt × RankBetweenj + β2Creditjt + β3RankBetweenj + θij + δt + ε ijt, (16)
where RankBetweenj is a function of firm j’s mean pay rank during a preperiod prior to the credit
supply shock, and θij and δt denote worker-firm and year fixed effects, respectively. The coefficient
of interest in equation (16) is β1, which measures the differential response of yijt to variation in
Creditjt throughout the between-firm pay distribution.
Firm-level aggregation. In addition to our worker-level analysis of the effects of credit, we are
also interested in outcomes aggregated to the firm level. To study such outcomes, we explicitly
take into account changes in worker composition due to separations and hires, which we previ-
ously held constant when including worker- or worker-firm match-specific controls. To estimate
the effect of credit supply on firm-level outcomes, we estimate the following specification:
yjt = βCreditjt + ψj + ζst + ε jt, (17)
where yjt is an outcome for firm j in year t, ψj denotes firm fixed effects, and ζst are state-year fixed
effects corresponding to state s = s(j) that firm j is located in.
3.2 Identification
The ideal experiment would involve manipulating the credit supply to a known subset of firms
but not others in a “macroeconomic laboratory.” Absent this ideal variation, we exploit as a shock
to credit supply the transmission of negative monetary policy rates to bank lending following
the implementation of negative deposit facility rates in the euro area. We show that this episode
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differentially affected credit supply to firms depending on their preexisting bank relationships
and banks’ balance sheet exposure to negative rates.
The deposit facility rate is the rate at which banks may make overnight deposits with the Eu-
rosystem, i.e., the ECB and national central banks of countries that have adopted the euro currency.
It is one of three main policy rates set by the Governing Council of the ECB and usually revised
every six weeks.15 In June 2014, for the first time in the history of the euro, the deposit facility rate
turned negative and has remained negative since then. Figure 1 shows the deposit facility rate
over our period of study between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2017.
During normal times with positive rates, a lower deposit facility rate is transmitted similarly to
rates that determine banks’ funding cost. Classical monetary theory predicts that, during normal
times, lower interest rates will incentivize banks to increase lending to firms in pursuit of higher
returns (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010).
Negative rates are different. Heider et al. (2019) argue that banks are reluctant, or unable, to
pass on negative rates to their depositors. Consequently, the spread between the deposit facility
rate and client rates decreases and banks that rely more on deposit funding incur higher costs of
funding. Using transaction-level data from the market for syndicated loans, Heider et al. (2019)
show that euro-area banks with greater reliance on deposit funding reduced lending by relatively
more in response to the introduction of negative monetary policy rates in 2014.
Our strategy for identifying firm-level credit supply shocks builds on Heider et al. (2019) in
that we exploit banks differential exposure to negative rates starting in 2014. We extend their
work in three important dimensions. First, we study private and public firms without the re-
striction to bank-firm relationships in the syndicated loans market in Germany. This allows us to
study a significantly larger fraction of firms and employment, since syndicated loans are almost
exclusively accessed by large corporations. Second, we move beyond bank-firm loan-level analy-
sis and aggregate the effects of the negative credit supply shock by studying firm-level leverage.
Firm-level aggregation is important because firms may be able to partly offset loan-level shocks
by substituting toward other existing loans or by forming new lender relationships. Third, we link
variation in credit supply to individual outcomes, including pay and employment, which would
not be possible absent worker-level panel data. This third point is crucial since we are interested
in the distributional effects of the monetary policy-induced credit supply shock.
15The other two policy rates are the main refinancing operations rate, which determines the cost at which banks can
engage in one-week borrowing, and the marginal lending facility rate, which determines the cost at which banks can
engage in overnight borrowing from the Eurosystem.
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We exploit this credit supply shock as follows. As a firm’s exposure to negative rates depends
on banks’ reliance on deposit funding, we sort firms into those in financing relationships with
high-deposit versus low-deposit banks. For this purpose, we combine data on firms’ self-reported
banking relationships with bank-level balance sheet information. Let Deposit ratioj denote the
average deposit ratio, that is the ratio of deposits to assets, across all euro-area (typically German)
banks that firm j reports to be in a banking relationship with during the preperiod from 2010
to 2013. Let After(2014)t denote a dummy variable for the years 2014–2017. Then, following the
above identification argument, we define as our credit supply shock proxy the following:
Creditjt ≡ Deposit ratioj ×After(2014)t. (18)
The proxy in equation (18) captures the idea that firms in relationships with banks, which were
more affected by negative rates after June 2014 through greater reliance on deposit funding, expe-
rienced a negative credit supply shock. This has been shown to be the case by Heider et al. (2019)
using loan-level data from the syndicated loans market across euro-member countries. We extend
this finding to the German context using a larger sample of private and public firms without the
restriction to the syndicated loans market.
3.3 Specification Details
We consider individual pay and employment as outcome variables associated with specifications
(14)–(16), which are concerned with the worker-level effects of credit supply. Specifically, we con-
sider for each individual their log wage and an indicator for whether they are no longer employed
next year. For the firm-level aggregate specification (17), we consider as outcome variables vari-
ous inequality measures, such as the log P90-P10 wage percentile ratio, and employment counts,
such as the log number of employees.
In the within-firm specification (15), we replace RankWithini by an indicator for the position
in the wage distribution at firm j where worker i was found in the last available year during the
preperiod 2010–2013. Specifically, we split the within-firm wage distribution into three parts. We
add to our specification indicators for the bottom wage quintile (Bottom 20% within firmi) and the
center quintiles (Middle 60% within firmi), leaving the top quintile (Top 20% within firmi) as the
omitted category.
In the between-firm specification (16), we replace RankBetweenj by a continuous variable Firm
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pay rankj that lies between 0 and 1, with 0 representing the firmwith the lowest and 1 representing
that with the highest mean wage in the last year prior to the introduction of negative rates (2013).
Finally, we cluster standard errors at the firm level throughout since we exploit variation in
firm-level exposure to a bank lending shock.
4 Data
4.1 Data Sources
For the first time, this paper combines multiple datasets spanning the complete credit chain in
Germany: starting from banks’ balance sheet exposure to monetary policy, to bank-firm lending
relationships and loan transactions, to firm financials, and finally to worker-level outcomes. Build-
ing this data infrastructure requires us to combinemicrodata from several different data providers,
including private and restricted public data sources.
Employment histories (IAB). At the heart of our analysis lie the administrative linked employer-
employee data hosted at Germany’s Institute for Employment Research (IAB). These restricted
public data contain employment histories based on social security records for essentially the uni-
verse of workers and establishments in Germany. The linked employer-employee nature of the
data means that we observe all workers within each establishment and that we can track both
entities over time.
Firm financials (Amadeus). We make use of firm financials data comprising private and public
firms’ balance sheet information based on data from Amadeus. These private data can be pur-
chased from Bureau van Dijk (BvD) and are distributed as part of the Orbis Historical data prod-
uct. The merge between the IAB linked employer-employee data and the Amadeus firm financials
data forms part of the IAB-internal data product Orbis-ADIAB (Schild, 2016; Antoni et al., 2018).16
This merge allows us to link individual establishments in the IAB data at the firm level.
Board compensation (BoardEx). We supplement the IAB worker earnings records with small-
sample information on compensation—including salary and bonus components—of board mem-
bers at companies listed on the German stock market index (DAX) from 2010 to 2016. We source
16At the time of writing, this data product is available to employees of IAB and will be made available to the global
research community along with other IAB data products in the future.
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this information from BoardEx, which we access via Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) and
merge with the other datasets via consistent BvD identifiers.
Bank-firm relationships (Creditreform). To capture firms’ bank credit relationships, we primar-
ily use firms’ self-reported bank relationships collected by Creditreform. These data identify private
and public firms’ principal and other bank affiliations, which we merge as before using BvD iden-
tifiers.
Loan transactions (DealScan). As an additional source of information on firms’ bank credit re-
lationships, we use data from Thomson Reuters DealScan on (typically large, public) firms’ trans-
actions in the syndicated loans market based on public filings, company statements, and media
reports. We hand-match data from DealScan to firms in the other datasets using a combination of
firm name, industry, and address, similar to Acharya et al. (2019) and Heider et al. (2019).
Bank balance sheets (SNL Financial). To measure banks’ exposure to negative rates, we take
balance sheet data from SNL Financial (now named S&P Global Market Intelligence), a financial
news and data services provider, for all banks that appear in the other datasets.
4.2 Description of Variables
The main variables of interest for our analysis are the deposit ratios of firms’ relationship banks and
workers’ wages and employment status. We measure a firm’s exposure to negative rates through the
mean ratio of deposits to assets across all euro-area (typically German) banks that a firm reports
to be in a banking relationship with during the preperiod from 2010 to 2013. Wages are defined
as the mean (log) daily earnings of full-time employees as reported in the IAB linked employer-
employee data.17 Since these data are based on social security records and subject to statutory
contribution limits, earnings are winsorized around the 90th to 95th percentile of the population.
Finally, unemployment is defined as a worker leaving our sample of employment records in a
given year.18
17We separately study part-time versus full-time employment shares as an outcome in our firm-level analysis.
18We explicitly account for temporary leaves and recalls by excluding these from our unemployment count.
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4.3 Sample Selection
We use data from years 2010 to 2017 to maximize our sample period subject to a balanced number
of years before and after the introduction of negative monetary policy rates in 2014. Exploiting the
matched employer-employee dimension of the merged data, we build a panel of workers indexed
by i across firms indexed by j and years indexed by t. Within a given worker-year it, we keep the
main job j, which we define as the highest-paid full-time job held by worker i in year t. We then
limit the sample to firms with information on bank relationships from Creditreform, which we
use to construct the credit supply shock exposure variable Creditjt ≡ Deposit ratioj × After(2014)t
as part of our empirical strategy.
4.4 Summary Statistics
Our final sample covers approximately 36% of total full-time workers in Germany, thus constitut-
ing a large sample of the German labor force. Table 1 presents summary statistics for this sample
and key variables from the merged dataset. In Panel A, we start out with German firms’ activities
in the syndicated loans market. As will be the case in Table 3, we build a panel at the firm-
bank-half-year level for syndicated loans granted to German firms in DealScan. Interestingly, the
average Deposit ratioj in this dataset is lower than in the merged administrative linked employer-
employee data (see Panel C), as only relatively large (typically publicly listed) firms in Germany
access the syndicated loans market. Large firms are, in turn, more likely to contract with banks
that rely less on deposit funding (and more on market funding), e.g., investment banks.
Panel B shows summary statistics at the worker-year level based on the merged data. Alto-
gether, our sample covers over 72 million worker-year observations, or an average of 9 million
observations per year. The average worker earns 37,294 euros (around 44 thousand US dollars)
per year, with a standard deviation of 18,541 euros (around 22 thousand US dollars). Around 9.6
percent of observations in a balanced panel based on our data are classified as unemployed.
Finally, Panel C summarizes key variables at the firm-year level based on the merged data.
The average deposit ratio is around 0.654, which is higher than that of firms in DealScan (in Panel
A). This is because syndicated loans are typically granted to relatively large firms, which are more
likely to contract with banks that rely more on market, rather than deposit, funding, e.g., invest-
ment banks. The mean P90/P10 wage percentile ratio is around 4.360 for all firms, and around
2.581 for the subset of publicly listed firms. Using small-sample evidence on compensation of
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board members at public firms, we find a large pay gap between board members and regular
workers. While the average firm in our sample has 3,935 employees, the firm size distribution
is positively skewed and fat-tailed. Average nonmanagerial employees stands at 3,777 and the
average number of part-time employees is 1,993.
Table 2 presents firm-level summary statistics separately for firms in the top and bottom quar-
tiles of the distribution of deposit ratios. Firms in relationships with high-deposit banks (Panel A),
which have greater exposure to negative rates, and firms in relationships with low-deposit banks
(Panel B) are similar in terms of several observable characteristics, including their average wage
and worker composition in terms of gender, nationality, and university education.
There are, however, some notable differences between the two groups. Although mean em-
ployment is similar across groups, the median firm in relationships with high-deposit banks has
nine employees, compared to twelve employees at firms in relationships with low-deposit banks.
Similarly, while the average firm in relationships with high-deposit banks has an asset value of
3.4 million euros, that of firms in relationships with low-deposit banks is 31.6 million euros. Note,
however, that this difference is relatively smaller when comparing median asset values of 0.73
million versus 1.17 million euros.
In terms of the remaining variables, both groups appear relatively similar. For example, lever-
age (defined as the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and short-term loans to assets), returns on
assets (ROA), ROA volatility (defined as the six-year standard deviation of a given firm’s ROA,
using profits and losses before taxes), cash- and investment-to-asset ratios are virtually identical
across groups.
It is important to note that baseline differences between firms in relationshipswith high- versus
low-deposit banks are not a threat to our identification. By including firm fixed effects in all
regression specifications, we control for such compositional differences. In our analysis of within-
firm inequality, we additionally include firm-year fixed effects, which account for permanent and
time-varying employer differences.
5 Results
We present our results in two steps. In the first step, we study the firm-level credit supply shock
due to the introduction of negative monetary policy rates. In the second step, we quantify the
effect of German firms’ exposure to negative rates through their banking relationships on the
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distribution of wages and employment.
5.1 Effect of Negative Monetary Policy Rates on Credit Supply
The goal of this section is to estimate the extent to which German firms in relationships with
high-deposit, rather than low-deposit, banks see a relative reduction in credit supply following
the introduction of negative monetary policy rates in June 2014. To conform as closely as possible
with the Orbis-ADIAB sample, we limit our analysis to German firms in Amadeus with data
coverage throughout 2010–2017 and at least ten employees. Furthermore, we drop a very small
number of firms that, according to the Amadeus data, have ratios of the sum of long-term debt
and short-term loans over assets of 0.05 and less, as those firms are unlikely to be affected by any
financing shock.
We start by using transaction-level data on syndicated loans of German firms based onDealScan.
While only a subset of German firms in our sample are active in the syndicated loans market, the
granularity of these data allows us to control for a rich set of codeterminants of firms’ credit access.
We focus on banks that act as lead arrangers in the syndication process. Lead arrangers are
those members of a syndicate that are typically responsible for traditional bank duties including
due diligence, payment management, andmonitoring of the loan (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010).
Based on all lead banks’ shares of completed syndicated loans of German corporations between
January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2017, we extend the sample to a balanced panel of borrowers j
and banks k over time t at semi-annual frequency.
To measure a firm’s exposure to the introduction of negative monetary policy rates, we first
compute the mean deposit ratio in 2013 of its relationship banks in the preperiod from 2010 to
2013, which we denote Deposit ratioj. We then estimate the following regression specification at
the firm-bank-time level jkt, where time therefore refers to the semi-annual level:
yjkt = βDeposit ratioj ×After(06/2014)t + κjk + λkt + ε jkt, (19)
where yjkt is an outcome associated with lending by bank k to firm j at time t, Deposit ratioj is the
average deposits-to-assets ratio, measured in 2013, across all (typically German) banks that firm
j reports to be in a banking relationship with anytime from 2010 to 2013, After(06/2014)t is an
indicator for whether the date falls after June 2014, and κjk and λkt denote firm-bank and bank-
time fixed effects, respectively. Our interest lies in estimates of the coefficient β in equation (19),
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which we interpret as the effect of greater exposure to negative rates on outcome yjkt. We cluster
standard errors at the bank level.
Table 3 presents the results of estimating (19). In the first two columns, the dependent variable
is an indicator for any non-zero share of firm j’s syndicated loans retained by bank k in t. In
the first column, we include only bank-firm and time fixed effects, and find that a one standard
deviation increase in Deposit ratioj (see Panel A in Table 1) is associated with a 0.126× 0.084 = 1.1
percentage points lower likelihood of attaining any loan. The mean level of Deposit ratioj is 0.374,
which implies that the average effect is a reduction in said likelihood by 3.1 percentage points.
This estimate becomes even larger in the second column, which adds bank-time fixed effects to
control for bank-wide shocks such as regulatory changes that affect bank lending across all clients.
In this case, the coefficient of interest, β, is estimated off firms in relationships with the same bank
in a given year. Among these firms, β captures the effect of differential exposure to high- versus
low-deposit banks in the preperiod on current lending by preexisting or new bank relationships.
All of these results hold when we replace the dependent variable by the natural logarithm of
one plus the total loan volume granted to firm j by bank k in t, as shown in the last two columns.
For each syndicated loan, we use information on each lead bank’s share from DealScan, which we
use to compute each lead bank’s total loan amount granted to a firm in a given time period.19
Together, these findings imply that firms in relationships with high-deposit banks receive less
credit following the introduction of negative policy rates.
In the next step, we establish that this reduction in borrowing is due to a reduction in credit
supply by banks rather than a reduction in firms’ credit demand. Following Heider et al. (2019),
we use bank k’s deposit ratio as the exposure variable and limit the sample to lead banks in
negative-rate currency areas (as opposed to all banks in the database, which we used before) from
which firm j borrowed anytime in the preperiod. In this manner, we test the intensive margin of
lending, i.e., whether high-deposit banks reduce their credit supply following the introduction of
negative policy rates to their existing borrowers.
Table 4 presents the results. In the first column, we use a short time window, from 2013 to
2015, around the introduction of negative policy rates in June 2014 so as to reduce the likelihood of
other bank-level events interfering with our identification. We also include firm-time fixed effects
that absorb time-varying unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, including loan demand. We
19Whenever available, we use loan shares as reported in DealScan. Otherwise, similar to Chodorow-Reich (2014),
we set the total loan share retained by lead arrangers in the syndicate equal to the sample mean, and divide it equally
among all lead arrangers in the syndicate.
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find that high-deposit banks reduce their credit supply after the introduction of negative policy
rates. The same conclusion applies for the whole sample period from 2010 to 2017 in column 2.
Using these estimates, a one standard deviation increase in banks’ deposit ratios implies a lower
likelihood of granting any loans through syndication by 0.176× 0.085 = 1.5 percentage points.
To show that negative rates are special, in column 3, we interact the deposit ratio with an in-
dicator for the period starting in July 2012, which is when the ECB reduced the deposit facility
rate from 0.25% to 0%, the lowest nonnegative monetary policy rate. We find that high-deposit
and low-deposit banks do not respond differently to this rate cut. Instead, we continue to find
that high-deposit, rather than low-deposit, banks start reducing their credit supply after the in-
troduction of negative policy rates in June 2014. Our interpretation of this finding is that the
pass-through of monetary policy to deposit rates breaks down when rates go below zero, as banks
are reluctant, or unable, to pass on negative rates to their depositors. As before, all of these results
hold when we replace the dependent variable by the actual loan amounts granted by lead banks
through syndication.
Our results imply that high-deposit banks reduce their credit supply in response to the in-
troduction of negative policy rates. As seen in Table 3, firms are unable to compensate for this
reduction in credit access by switching to other banks, e.g., those outside negative-rate currency
areas.
As the credit limit in our model in Section 2 could be interpreted as the sum of all sources of
a firm’s external debt financing, we confirm, using our panel of German firms in Amadeus, that
firms in relationships with high-deposit banks see a reduction in overall debt financing. For this
purpose, we run the following firm-year-level regression:
Leveragejt = βDeposit ratioj ×After(2014)t + ψj + δt + ε jt, (20)
where Leveragejt is the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and short-term loans (in Amadeus) all
over firm j’s assets in year t,Deposit ratioj is the average deposits-to-assets ratio, measured in 2013,
across all (typically German) banks that firm j reports to be in a banking relationship with anytime
from 2010 to 2013, After(2014)t is a dummy variable for the years 2014–2017, and ψj and δt denote
firm and year fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Figure 2 plots estimates of β over our sample period. The coefficient is statistically insignifi-
cantly different from zero throughout the preperiod 2010–2013 and becomes negative and signif-
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icant at the 10% level starting with the first full year of negative rates in 2015. In terms of point
estimates, a one standard deviation increase inDeposit ratioj (see Panel C in Table 1) translates into
a reduction in leverage (a scaled variable between 0 and 1) by up to 0.04× 0.153 = 0.6 percentage
points. This suggests that firms in relationships with high-deposit banks do not only experience
impaired credit access but also wind up with less leverage overall.
5.2 Effects on the Distribution of Wages and Employment
Having established that firms in relationships with high-deposit, rather than low-deposit, banks
experienced worse access to credit, not only within preexisting relationships but also across other
banks, and to external debt financingmore generally, our next goal is to estimate the effect of firms’
exposure to negative policy rates on the distribution of wages and employment in our worker-
level sample.
Mean effects. We start by looking at effects of mean wages and unemployment, corresponding
to specification (14) of our empirical strategy at the worker-year level:
yijt = βDeposit ratioj × A f ter(2014)t + θij + δt + ε ijt, (21)
where yijt is an outcome for worker i at firm j in year t, Deposit ratioj is the average deposits-to-
assets ratio, measured in 2013, across all (typically German) banks that firm j reports to be in a
banking relationship with anytime from 2010 to 2013, After(2014)t is a dummy variable for the
years 2014–2017, and θij and δt denote worker-firm and year fixed effects, respectively.
Table 5 shows results from estimating a variant of equation (21) that uses as dependent vari-
able either worker i’s log wage at firm j or her employment status in the following year. When
including worker, firm, and year fixed effects, we find that workers at more exposed firms see,
on average, a relative reduction in wages (column 1) and higher unemployment risk (column 3).
These findings are consistent with the predictions of Lemmas 1 and A.2.3 of our model that a tight-
ening of the credit constraint reduces labor demand of affected firms, which respond by lowering
their wage and vacancy postings.
Columns 2 and 4 show that the effects on wages and unemployment become stronger when
including worker-firm match fixed effects, which means the coefficient of interest, β, is estimated
off workers that were either employed at the same firm before and after 2014, or no longer em-
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ployed only after 2014. Based on these estimates, a one standard deviation increase in firms’
exposure, captured by Deposit ratioj, translates into 0.153× 0.077 = 1.2 percent lower wages and a
0.153× 0.011 = 0.2 percentage points increase in the probability of becoming unemployed.
Within-firm heterogeneity. These estimated mean effects on wages and employment may mask
important heterogeneity across worker groups within firms. To investigate this, we estimate the
following variant of specification (15) of our empirical strategy, which adds an interaction term
indicating a worker’s position in the within-firm wage distribution:
yijt = β1Deposit ratioj × A f ter(2014)t × Bottom 20% within f irmi
+ β2Deposit ratioj × A f ter(2014)t ×Middle 60% within f irmi
+ β3Deposit ratioj × Bottom 20% within f irmi + β4Deposit ratioj ×Middle 60% within f irmi
+ β5A f ter(2014)t × Bottom 20% within f irmi + β6A f ter(2014)t ×Middle 60% within f irmi
+ θij + ηjt + ε ijt, (22)
where yijt is either the wage or an indicator for unemployment next period for worker i employed
at firm j in year t, Bottom 20% within firmi (Middle 60% within firmi) is an indicator variable for
whether worker i’s wage is in the bottom 20% (middle 60%) of the wage distribution of the firm
where worker i was employed in the last available year during the preperiod from 2010 to 2013,
and θij and ηjt denote worker-firm and firm-year fixed effects, respectively. The coefficients of in-
terest in equation (22) are β1 and β2, which capture the extent to which firms’ exposure to negative
rates differentially affects workers within the bottom 20% and middle 60% of the wage distribu-
tion relative to workers in the top 20%.
Table 6 presents the results from estimating specification (22) on the data. We always include
worker fixed effects, controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity at the worker level. In column 1,
we include also firm and year fixed effects, and replace those by firm-year fixed effects in column
2. Firm-year fixed effects control for time-varying heterogeneity at the firm level, such as firm-
wide developments that may be correlated with firms’ heterogenous exposure to negative policy
rates through their banking relationships.
In this manner, we find that individuals that used to earn a wage in the bottom 20% of their
respective firms’ wage distributions see their wages grow more at more exposed firms after the
introduction of negative policy rates than the top 20% (the omitted category). This result remains
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robust after adding worker-firm fixed effects in column 3.20 A one standard deviation increase in
firms’ exposure as captured by Deposit ratioj translates into a 0.153× 0.051 = 0.8 percent reduc-
tion in wages of workers in the top 20% versus those in the bottom 20% of the within-firm wage
distribution. Since the coefficient of interest for the wage regression is now estimated off workers
who stay at the same employer before and after the introduction of negative rates, these results
are driven by wage effects on incumbents rather than new hires.
In the last three columns, we estimate specification (22) with the dependent variable replaced
by an indicator for whether worker i is unemployed in year t + 1. We find significant unem-
ployment effects for workers in the middle 60% of the within-firm wage distribution across all
three specifications. In column 4 and column 6, when including worker-firm fixed effects, we
find that all workers outside of the top 20% of the within-firm wage distribution face higher risk
of being laid off following the negative credit supply shock. Quantitatively, the additional lay-
off risk for workers below the top 20% of the within-firm wage distribution amounts to between
0.153× 0.013 = 0.2 and 0.153× 0.019 = 0.3 percentage points (column 6). Note that in this con-
text, the inclusion of worker-firm fixed effects implies that we identify the effect in column 6 off
workers that did not switch to another firm (neither from employment nor from unemployment)
in the year after the shock, i.e., in 2015.
The empirical observation that wages are more rigid for lower-paid workers may partly reflect
that, coinciding with our postperiod, Germany introduced a federal minimum wage of 8.50 euros
on January 1, 2015. To the extent that workers near the bottom of thewithin-firmwage distribution
find themselves at or near this threshold, their wages are downwardly-rigid. On the flipside, the
higher downward wage rigidity of low-paid workers could also rationalize our finding that these
workers are relatively more likely to become unemployed following the credit supply shock. In
line with our theoretical model, our interpretation of this finding is that larger firms initially pay
a premium for high-skill workers, which a negative credit supply shock reduces.
In summary, we find that initially higher-paid workers receive greater wage cuts, while ini-
tially lower-paid workers are more likely to become unemployed. As a consequence and in line
with part (a) of Proposition 1, within-firm wage inequality decreases.
20Note that for workers that do not switch firms, it holds that firm j associated with both Bottom 20% within firmi
(Middle 60% within firmi) and the fixed effects ηjt are identical. This is automatically the case when we include worker-
firm match fixed effects.
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Between-firm heterogeneity. While we have shown that the credit supply shock due to negative
policy rates led to lower wages on average, we now address the extent to which different firms
adjusted wages differentially. To explore this, we estimate the following variant of specification
(16) of our empirical strategy, which adds an interaction term indicating a firm’s mean wage rank:
yijt = β1Deposit ratioj × A f ter(2014)t × Firm pay rank j
+ β2Deposit ratioj × A f ter(2014)t + β3A f ter(2014)t × Firm pay rank j
+ θij + δt + ε ijt, (23)
where yijt is either the wage or an indicator for unemployment next period for worker i employed
at firm j in year t, Firm pay rankj is firm j’s mean wage rank among all firms in 2013, with 0 being
the lowest rank and 1 being the highest rank, and θij and δt denote worker-firm and year fixed
effects, respectively. The coefficient of interest in equation (23) is β1, which captures the extent to
which firms at higher pay ranks differentially respond to exposure to negative rates.
Table 7 presents the results from estimating specification (23). Column 1, which includes only
firm and year fixed effects, shows that initially higher-paying firms respond to negative rates with
relatively larger wage cuts, with a coefficient estimate of -0.107 (standard error of 0.031). The
estimated coefficient goes in the same direction but becomes weaker and statistically insignifi-
cant after including worker fixed effects in column 2, suggesting that some of this effect is due
to changes in worker composition. Including worker-firm fixed effects in column 3, however,
shows that there is a significant effect on incumbent workers, with a coefficient estimate of -0.137
(standard error of 0.031).
The remaining three columns test for differential unemployment effects across firm pay ranks.
To this end, we estimate a variant of specification (23) with the dependent variable replaced by
an indicator for whether a worker will be unemployed next period. Column 4 shows a negative
estimate of the interaction coefficient of -0.012 (standard error of 0.007) that falls short of being
statistically significant at conventional levels. The coefficient of interest turns statistically negative
and significant, with a point estimate of -0.028 (standard error of 0.009) when including worker
fixed effects in column 5. In our preferred specification with worker-firm fixed effects in column
6, the coefficient is still negative but again not statistically significant.
Our interpretation of these findings is that higher-paying firms are plausibly less constrained
by a binding minimum wage and other wage floors. As a consequence of the plausibly lower
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wage rigidity at initially higher-paying firms, a tightening of credit supply leads initially higher-
paying firms to decrease their pay bymore because they can. Since they can reduce their labor cost
by lowering wages, these firms are less inclined to lay off workers following the negative credit
supply shock.
In summary, we find that initially higher-paying firms give greater wage cuts while at the
same time retaining weakly more of their workforce. As a consequence and in line with part (b)
of Proposition 1, between-firm wage inequality decreases.
Firm-level aggregation. In our worker-level analysis above, we have studied the effect of a neg-
ative credit supply shock on the distribution of wages within and between firms. Throughout this
analysis, we have been holding constant worker composition by including worker- or worker-firm
fixed effects. In addition to our worker-level analysis, we are also interested in outcomes aggre-
gated to the firm level, which we now turn to. In doing so, we explicitly take account of changes
in worker composition due to hiring and separations.
To this end, we construct measures of within-firm wage inequality for all firms in each year.
We then estimate variants of specification (17) of our empirical strategy at the firm-year level:
yjt = βDeposit ratioj ×After(2014)t + ψj + ζst + ε jt, (24)
where yjt is a measure of within-firm pay inequality for firm j in year t, ψj denotes firm fixed
effects, and ζst are state-year fixed effects corresponding to state s = s(j) that firm j is located in.
Table 8 presents the results from estimating specification (24) for different inequality measures
and different samples in our data. Columns 1–3 take as dependent variable yjt the log P90-P10
wage percentile ratio. All three columns include firm and state-year fixed effects, thereby control-
ling for time-invariant firm-specific and time-varying regional heterogeneity. Column 1, which
includes all firms in our sample, indicates a modest reduction in within-firm wage inequality at
more affected firms, with a coefficient estimate of -0.013 (standard error of 0.006). This is consis-
tent with our worker-level finding of greater wage cuts among higher pay ranks within firms, as
detailed in Table 6.
Motivated by evidence that larger, publicly listed firms may exhibit greater within-firm wage
inequality (Mueller et al., 2017), we run the same regression separately for public firms in column
2. In doing so, we find that the reduction in within-firm inequality due to the negative credit shock
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is even more emphasized for firms in this small subsample.
One advantage of using this subsample is that it comprises firms that are large and covered
also in our syndicated loans data from DealScan, which we have used in Tables 3 and 4. Those
firms are likely to receive syndicated loans not only from German and other euro-area banks, but
also from non-euro area banks whose lending behavior should not be affected by the introduction
of a negative interest-rate policy in the euro area. This enables us to conduct a falsification test in
column 3 by adding an interaction term between After(2014)t and Non-euro deposit ratioj ∈ [0, 1],
which is the average deposit ratio across all non-euro area lead arrangers (and other banks not
based in negative-rate currency areas) that firm j received a syndicated loan from in the preperiod
from 2010 to 2013. The respective coefficient amounts to only one-quarter of our difference-in-
differences estimate, and is statistically insignificant.
While rich in many dimensions, the IAB linked employer-employee data do not allow us to
measure top-wage inequality due to the data being winsorized at the social security contribution
threshold, which falls around the 90th to 95th percentile of the population earnings distribution.
This type of top-coding may be particularly relevant for the pay structure at public firms, which
tend to offer high variable compensation to their top management (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003;
Gabaix and Landier, 2008). A plausible way for firms to reduce pay at the top of the distribution
is through adjusting such variable compensation.
To test for this, we use information on compensation for executive board members of 26 of the
DAX-listed firms from BoardEx.21 In columns 4–6 of Table 8, we provide small-sample evidence
that a negative credit supply shock is associatedwith a reduction of top-to-bottomwage inequality
within firms. Column 4 shows a point estimate that is large and negative but noisily estimated
and barely significant at the 10% level. Splitting board pay further into salary and bonus pay, we
find a significant negative reduction in bonus (column 6), but not in salary (column 5). This lends
support to the idea that firms respond to tighter financial constraints by reducing top-earners’
variable compensation.
We also consider the effects of the negative credit supply shock on firm-level employment. The
key difference between this analysis and our previous worker-analysis is that we now take into
account both new hires and separations. Table 9 presents the results from estimating specification
(24) for different employment counts. All specifications in this table control for firm and state-year
21Since German company board seats are partly allocated to worker representatives and other nonexecutives, we
drop these from our data. When estimating pay effects for nonexecutive board members in Table B.1 of Appendix B.1,
who typically do not receive substantial variable compensation, we find no significant response in their relative pay.
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fixed effects. Column 1 shows that firmsmore exposed to negative rates see a significant reduction
in overall employment. We estimate a coefficient of -0.021 (standard error of 0.007), suggesting that
a one standard deviation increase in firm-level exposure is associated with a 0.153× 0.021 = 0.3
percent reduction in total employment. Column 2 shows that this effect is around 30% larger for
nonmanagerial employees. Column 3 shows that, as a result, more exposed firms see significant
reduction in their share of nonmanagerial workers. Finally, column 4 shows that the negative
credit supply shock is also associated with a reduction of part-time work, suggesting that those
workers are more likely to leave employment or else convert to full-time positions.
6 Conclusion
Using a theory-guided empirical approach, we study the distributional effects of a monetary
policy-induced firm-level credit supply shock on individual wages and employment. To this end,
we build a unique dataset spanning the complete credit chain from banks’ balance sheet exposure
to monetary policy to individual worker-level outcomes in Germany. We identify firm-level varia-
tion in credit supply by exploiting information on firms’ preexisting bank relationships at the time
of the introduction of negative monetary policy rates by the ECB in June 2014. We show that firms
in relationships with more deposit-reliant banks see a significant reduction in credit as a conse-
quence of the negative rates. Credit tightening in turn lowers wages and employment of workers
at those firms. These effects are concentrated among distinct worker groups within firms, with
initially lower-paid workers more likely to be fired and initially higher-paid workers more likely
to receive wage cuts. At the same time, wages decline by more at initially high-paying firms. Con-
sequently, wage inequality within and between firms decreases as a result of the negative credit
supply shock.
There are two important takeaways from our work. First, a monetary policy-induced firm-
level credit supply shock affects wages as well as employment. This fact contradicts predictions
of models featuring competitive labor markets. Instead, this fact is consistent with the predic-
tions of a simple equilibrium model of firm credit in a frictional labor market. Second, monetary
policy, through its effect on credit supply, has important distributional consequences in the la-
bor market. Inequality is not traditionally of direct concern to central bankers. Nevertheless, our
findings are valuable in light of a new generation of empirically-oriented models that integrate
heterogeneity and market frictions in a monetary policy framework. Our work highlights firm
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pay heterogeneity as a novel channel through which monetary policy can have important distri-
butional consequences.
Our findings point in interesting directions for future work. First, while our analysis focuses
exclusively on workers’ wages and employment, it seems natural to explore other margins of ad-
justment in response to variation in credit supply. Such margins include firm investment in new
technologies, worker investment in human capital, and more drastic organizational change such
as outsourcing. Second, while our focus on a particular monetary policy episode that involved
negative interest rates allows us to cleanly identify firm-level variation in credit supply, it would
be compelling to study other instances of monetary policy, including conventional and unconven-
tional policies. Different monetary policy interventions may be associated with different effects
on the real economy, along with different distributional consequences. Third and finally, our em-
pirical strategy focuses on a relatively recent episode, namely the introduction of negative policy
rates in June 2014. This necessarily means that our findings reflect short-term adjustments to vari-
ation in credit supply. Understanding the long-term effects of credit disruptions on worker-level
outcomes appears equally important and deserving of further investigation.
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Figures
Figure 1: Deposit Facility Rate by Eurosystem, 2010–2017
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Notes: This figure plots the deposit facility rate on overnight deposits with the Eurosystem set by the European Central
Bank between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2017. Source: ECB.
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Figure 2: Impact of Negative Policy Rates on Firms’ Leverage
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Notes: This figure plots estimates of β, alongside 90% confidence bands, over time based on the difference-in-differences
specification in (20), estimated on the sample of German firms in the administrative linked employer-employee data
merged with Amadeus from 2010 to 2017.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. P5 P50 P95 No. of observations
Panel A: Firm-bank-half-year level
Deposit ratio 0.374 0.126 0.235 0.337 0.552 22,016
Any loan share 0.141 0.348 0 0 1 22,016
Total loan amount (bn euros) 0.069 0.194 0.008 0.035 0.152 3,068
Panel B: Worker-year level
Annualized wage (euros) 37,294 18,541 8,317 35,249 70,949 72,130,131
Unemployed next year 0.096 0.294 0 0 1 66,250,135
Panel C: Firm-year level
Deposit ratio 0.654 0.153 0.257 0.693 0.837 2,786,063
Wage P90/P10 4.360 212.164 1.000 2.091 9.541 2,751,334
Wage P90/P10 at public firms 2.581 3.222 1.170 2.007 4.352 1,335
Board total P50/Wage P5 180.113 842.094 28.666 60.360 275.762 264
Board salary P50/Wage P5 61.837 293.229 12.932 25.318 85.864 264
Board bonus P50/Wage P5 119.590 571.595 11.868 35.884 193.287 262
No. of employees 3,935 80,052 2 11 142 2,786,063
No. of nonmanagerial employees 3,777 76,843 1 10 133 2,786,063
No. of part-time employees 1,993 40,785 0 3 46 2,786,063
Notes: The summary statistics in Panel A refer to the firm-bank-half-year level for syndicated loans granted to German
firms in DealScan, and correspond to the respective descriptions and the sample in Table 3. Total loan amount is
conditional on having any loan. The summary statistics in Panel B refer to the dependent variables at the worker-
year level, and correspond to the respective descriptions in Tables 5 to 7. The variables in Panel C correspond to the
respective descriptions in Tables 8 and 9.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Firms with High versus Low Exposure
Variable Mean Std. dev. P5 P50 P95 No. of firms
Panel A: German firms related to banks in the highest quartile of the deposit-ratio distribution
No. of employees 4,459 82,542 1 9 82 88,899
Average annualized wage (euros) 27,361 11,204 11,560 25,800 48,140 88,899
Proportion female 0.252 0.320 0.000 0.111 1.000 88,899
Proportion foreigner 0.070 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.500 88,899
Proportion university 0.110 0.236 0.000 0.000 0.700 88,899
Assets (mm euros) 3.417 65.291 0.079 0.725 8.764 62,117
Leverage 0.201 0.244 0.000 0.098 0.730 34,224
ROA 0.113 0.127 0.005 0.071 0.368 8,191
ROA volatility 0.062 0.064 0.006 0.041 0.188 4,379
Cash/Assets 0.192 0.207 0.001 0.117 0.635 59,711
Investment/Assets 0.070 0.101 0.000 0.033 0.272 25,585
Panel B: German firms related to banks in the lowest quartile of the deposit-ratio distribution
No. of employees 4,235 81,005 1 12 231 87,150
Average annualized wage (euros) 32,846 13,895 12,499 31,099 58,226 87,150
Proportion female 0.297 0.317 0.000 0.200 1 87,150
Proportion foreigner 0.080 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.500 87,150
Proportion university 0.191 0.287 0.000 0.035 1 87,150
Assets (mm euros) 31.612 1,529 0.096 1.172 44.720 61,893
Leverage 0.158 0.228 0.000 0.031 0.675 37,468
ROA 0.125 0.131 0.007 0.085 0.388 13,557
ROA volatility 0.071 0.066 0.009 0.052 0.200 9,636
Cash/Assets 0.194 0.214 0.001 0.113 0.650 59,007
Investment/Assets 0.065 0.105 0.000 0.025 0.271 25,173
Notes: This table shows firm-level summary statistics for the last pre-treatment year 2013, namely for German corpora-
tions in the top (Panel A) and bottom (Panel B) quartile of the distribution ofDeposit ratioj, which is the average deposit
ratio, measured in 2013, across all (typically German) banks that firm j reports to be in a banking relationship with
anytime from 2010 to 2013.
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Table 3: Impact of Negative Policy Rates on Lending to German Firms
Any loan share ∈ {0, 1} ln(1+ total loan volume)
Sample 2010–2017
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Deposit ratioj × After(06/2014) -0.084*** -0.101*** -1.254** -1.559***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.511) (0.514)
Bank-firm FE Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y N Y N
Bank-time FE N Y N Y
N 21,274 21,158 21,274 21,158
Notes: Based on all lead banks’ shares of completed syndicated loans of German corporations j anytime from January
2010 to December 2017, the sample is extended so as to represent a balanced panel of all borrower-bank pairs at the
semi-annual frequency. Time therefore refers to the semi-annual level. All singletons are dropped from the total number
of observations N. In the first two columns, the dependent variable is an indicator for any nonzero share of firm j’s
loans retained by bank k in t. In the last two columns, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the
total loan volume granted to firm j by bank k in t. Deposit ratioj ∈ [0, 1] is the average deposits-to-assets ratio, measured
in 2013, across all (typically German) banks that firm j reports to be in a banking relationship with anytime from 2010
to 2013. After(06/2014)t is a dummy variable for the period from June 2014 onwards. Energy and financial-services
borrower firms are dropped. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Impact of Negative Policy Rates on German Firms’ Preexisting Banking Relationships
Any loan share ∈ {0, 1} ln(1+ total loan volume)
Sample Lead banks k in negative-rate currency areas
from which firms j borrowed anytime in preperiod
2013–2015 2010–2017 2013–2015 2010–2017
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deposit ratiok × After(06/2014) -0.158** -0.085* -0.122* -2.630* -1.475* -2.099*
(0.076) (0.048) (0.061) (1.382) (0.852) (1.108)
Deposit ratiok × After(07/2012) 0.066 1.113
(0.089) (1.611)
Bank-firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 6,508 15,554 15,554 6,508 15,554 15,554
Notes: Based on all lead banks’ shares of completed syndicated loans of German corporations j anytime from January
2010 to June 2014, the sample is extended so as to represent a balanced panel of all borrower-bank pairs at the semi-
annual frequency from 2010 to 2017. Time therefore refers to the semi-annual level. Furthermore, the sample is limited
to banks in currency areas with negative monetary policy rates (that lend to German firms at any point in the preperiod
from January 2010 to June 2014). All singletons are dropped from the total number of observations N. In the first three
columns, the dependent variable is an indicator for any nonzero share of firm j’s loans retained by bank k in t. In the
last three columns, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the total loan volume granted to firm j
by bank k in t. Deposit ratiok ∈ [0, 1] is bank k’s ratio of deposits over total assets in 2013. After(06/2014)t is a dummy
variable for the period from June 2014 onwards. After(07/2012)t is a dummy variable for the period from July 2012
onwards. Energy and financial-services borrower firms are dropped. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank
level) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Effects of Monetary Policy-Induced Credit Supply Shock on Wages and Layoff Rates
ln(wage) Unemployed next year ∈ {0, 1}
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Deposit ratio × After(2014) -0.019** -0.077*** 0.007** 0.011***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004)
Worker FE Y N Y N
Firm FE Y N Y N
Worker-firm FE N Y N Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
N 70,137,681 67,731,621 65,253,153 63,505,552
Notes: The sample consists of full-time employees i at German corporations j in year t from 2010 to 2017. The dependent
variable in the first two columns is the natural logarithm of the wage of individual i at firm j in year t. The dependent
variable in the last two columns is an indicator variable for whether individual i is unemployed in year t+ 1. Deposit
ratioj ∈ [0, 1] is the average deposits-to-assets ratio, measured in 2013, across all (typically German) banks that firm j
reports to be in a banking relationship with anytime from 2010 to 2013. After(2014)t is a dummy variable for the years
2014–2017. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Effects of Monetary Policy-Induced Credit Supply Shock on Wages and Layoff Rates, by Within-Firm Pay Rank
ln(wage) Unemployed next year ∈ {0, 1}
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deposit ratio × After(2014) × Bottom 20% within firm 0.034* 0.069*** 0.051*** 0.009** 0.004 0.013***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Deposit ratio × After(2014) ×Middle 60% within firm -0.017** -0.012* -0.014** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.019***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Deposit ratio × After(2014) -0.008 -0.008**
(0.007) (0.003)
Deposit ratio × Bottom 20% within firm -0.136*** -0.142*** 0.004 0.009**
(0.021) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004)
Deposit ratio ×Middle 60% within firm -0.112*** -0.106*** 0.001 0.003
(0.015) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003)
After(2014) × Bottom 20% within firm 0.154*** 0.141*** 0.071*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.050***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
After(2014) ×Middle 60% within firm 0.010** 0.007 -0.011** -0.005*** -0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Worker FE Y Y N Y Y N
Firm FE Y N N Y N N
Worker-firm FE N N Y N N Y
Year FE Y N N Y N N
Firm-year FE N Y Y N Y Y
N 61,987,235 61,519,347 59,839,079 58,204,386 57,773,587 56,308,377
Notes: The sample consists of full-time employees i at German corporations j in year t from 2010 to 2017. The dependent variable in the first three columns is the
natural logarithm of the wage of individual i at firm j in year t. The dependent variable in the last three columns is an indicator variable for whether individual i is
unemployed in year t+ 1. Deposit ratioj ∈ [0, 1] is the average deposits-to-assets ratio, measured in 2013, across all (typically German) banks that firm j reports to
be in a banking relationship with anytime from 2010 to 2013. After(2014)t is a dummy variable for the years 2014–2017. Bottom 20% (Middle 60%) within firmi is an
indicator variable for whether worker i’s wage is in the bottom 20% (middle 60%) of the wage distribution of the firm where i was employed in the last available
year during the preperiod from 2010 to 2013. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Effects of Monetary Policy-Induced Credit Supply Shock on Wages and Layoff Rates, by Firm Pay Rank
ln(wage) Unemployed next year ∈ {0, 1}
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deposit ratio × After(2014) × Firm pay rank -0.107*** -0.050 -0.137*** -0.012 -0.028*** -0.009
(0.031) (0.037) (0.031) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Deposit ratio × After(2014) 0.021 -0.017 0.060*** 0.003 0.002 -0.017***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.019) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
After(2014) × Firm pay rank -0.061*** -0.034 0.173*** 0.001 -0.033*** -0.065***
(0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Worker FE N Y N N Y N
Firm FE Y Y N Y Y N
Worker-firm FE N N Y N N Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 71,540,608 69,627,349 67,372,241 65,654,460 64,700,521 63,076,967
Notes: The sample consists of full-time employees i at German corporations j in year t from 2010 to 2017. The dependent variable in the first three columns is the
natural logarithm of the wage of individual i at firm j in year t. The dependent variable in the last three columns is an indicator variable for whether individual i is
unemployed in year t+ 1. Deposit ratioj ∈ [0, 1] is the average deposits-to-assets ratio, measured in 2013, across all (typically German) banks that firm j reports to be
in a banking relationship with anytime from 2010 to 2013. After(2014)t is a dummy variable for the years 2014–2017. Firm pay rankj is the rank (from 0 = lowest to
1 = highest) of firm j in terms of its average pay in 2013. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 8: Firm-Level Effects of Monetary Policy-Induced Credit Supply Shock on Within-Firm Inequality
ln(P90/P10) ln(P90/P10) ln(P90/P10) ln(P50 board total/P5) ln(P50 board salary/P5) ln(P50 board bonus/p5)
Sample All Public firms Public firms DAX firms DAX firms DAX firms
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deposit ratio × After(2014) -0.013** -0.318* -0.438** -1.080* -0.899 -1.137*
(0.006) (0.174) (0.208) (0.588) (0.543) (0.629)
Non-euro deposit ratio × After(2014) -0.107
(0.151)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State-year FE Y Y Y N N N
Year FE N N N Y Y Y
N 2,738,752 1,321 1,141 264 264 262
Notes: The unit of observation is the firm-year level jt. In column 1, the sample consists of all German corporations j in year t from 2010 to 2017. In columns 2 and 3,
the sample is limited to all publicly listed German corporations j that are active in the syndicated loans market in year t from 2010 to 2017. In the last three columns,
the sample consists of DAX-listed German corporations j in year t from 2010 to 2016 for which we have board-compensation data from BoardEx. In the first three
columns, the dependent variable is the delta log of the wage at the 90th versus 10th percentile of firm j’s wage distribution in year t. The dependent variable in
column 4 is the delta log of the median total compensation, consisting of a salary and a potential bonus, of executive board members at firm j in year t versus the
wage at the 5th percentile of firm j’s wage distribution in year t. The dependent variable in column 5 is the delta log of the median salary of executive board members
at firm j in year t versus the wage at the 5th percentile of firm j’s wage distribution in year t. The dependent variable in column 6 is the delta log of the median bonus
(conditional on being nonzero) of executive board members at firm j in year t versus the wage at the 5th percentile of firm j’s wage distribution in year t. Deposit
ratioj ∈ [0, 1] is the average deposits-to-assets ratio, measured in 2013, across all (typically German) banks that firm j reports to be in a banking relationship with
anytime from 2010 to 2013. Non-euro deposit ratioj ∈ [0, 1] is the average deposits-to-assets ratio, measured in 2013, across all non-euro area banks (and other banks
not based in negative-rate currency areas) from which firm j received syndicated loans anytime from 2010 to 2013. After(2014)t is an indicator variable for the years
2014–2017 in the first three columns (2014–2016 in all remaining columns). State-year fixed effects are based on firm j’s state of incorporation. Robust standard errors
(clustered at the firm level) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 9: Firm-Level Effects of Monetary Policy-Induced Credit Supply Shock on Employment
ln(no. of all employees) ln(no. of nonmanagerial employees) Share nonmanagerial Share part-time
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Deposit ratio × After(2014) -0.021*** -0.028*** -0.006*** -0.011***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
State-year FE Y Y Y Y
N 2,774,289 2,774,289 2,774,289 2,774,289
Notes: The unit of observation is the firm-year level jt. In the first four columns, the sample consists of all German corporations j in year t from 2010 to 2017. The
dependent variable in column 1 is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees at firm j in year t. The dependent variable in column 2 is the natural
logarithm of the number of nonmanagerial employees at firm j in year t. The dependent variable in column 3 is the ratio, between 0 and 1, of nonmanagerial staff
over all employees at firm j in year t. The dependent variable in column 4 is the ratio, between 0 and 1, of part-time staff over all employees at firm j in year t. Deposit
ratioj ∈ [0, 1] is the average deposits-to-assets ratio, measured in 2013, across all (typically German) banks that firm j reports to be in a banking relationship with
anytime from 2010 to 2013. After(2014)t is an indicator variable for the years 2014–2017. State-year fixed effects are based on firm j’s state of incorporation. Robust
standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Online Appendix—Not for Publication
A Model Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium Definition
Definition 1. A stationary search equilibrium is a set of worker value functions {Sa,Wa}a and policy
functions {φa}a; firm value function Π and policy functions {wa, va}a; wage offer distributions {Fa(w)}a;
measures of unemployed workers {ua}a, aggregate job searchers {Ua}a, aggregate vacancies {Va}a, and
labor market tightnesses {θa}a; job offer arrival rates {λua ,λ
e
a; and firm sizes {la}a such that for all a:
• Given Fa(w) and {λua ,λ
e
a}, the value functions Sa and Wa satisfy equations (1) and (2);
• Unemployed workers’ job acceptance policy follows a threshold rule φa given by equation (3) and
employed workers with wage w accept any job w′ such that w′ > w;
• Given la(·), firms’ value function Π satisfies equation (5);
• Firms policy functions {wa, va} solve the problem in equation (5);
• Measures of unemployed workers are given by equation (4), aggregate job searchers Ua are given by
equation (6), aggregate vacancies Va are given by equation (7), and labor market tightness θa is given
by equation (8).
• Given θa, the job offer arrival rates {λua ,λ
e
a} satisfy equation (9);
• Given Fa(w), {λua ,λ
e
a}a, and Va, firm sizes satisfy equation (10);
• The offer distribution satisfies Fa(w) =
∫
j va(j)1[wa(j) ≤ w] dΓ(j)/Va.
A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof follows closely that in Morchio and Moser (2020). We first reformulate the firm’s
problem. Define p˜ = p 1+r
1+(1+ψ)r
, where ψ is the Lagrange multiplier on a firm’s credit constraint,
as in equation (13) of the main text. We then proceed in two steps.
Step 1. In the first step, we prove monotonicity of w∗a in components of p˜. We can rewrite the
firm’s FOCs as
[∂wa] : 1 = ( p˜− wa)
2λea fa(wa)
δa + λGa + λea(1− Fa(wa))
(25)
[∂va] : c
v,0
a
∂c˜v(va)
∂va
= Ta( p˜− wa)
(
1
δa + λGa + λea(1− Fa(wa))
)2
, (26)
where Ta = µa[(ua+ sGa )λ
u
a (δa+λ
G
a +λ
e
a)]/Va. Equation (25) already shows that the optimal wage
wa is independent of the cost of posting vacancies, proving the first statement. Now consider
equation (26); because the term on the right-hand side is always positive for p˜ > φa, it follows that
optimal vacancies v∗a( p˜, c
v,0
a ) are always strictly positive.
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We now show that the derivative of wages with respect to p˜ is always positive. Define ha( p˜) =
Fa(w∗a( p˜)). Thus:
ha( p˜) =
∫ p˜
p˜′≥φa
v∗a( p˜)γa( p˜)
Va
d p˜′ (27)
h′a( p˜) = fa(w
∗
a( p˜))w
∗
a
′( p˜) (28)
fa(w
∗
a( p˜)) =h
′
a( p˜)/w
∗
a
′( p˜), (29)
where v∗a( p˜) =
∫
v∗a( p˜, c
′)γca(c
′| p˜) dc′ is the integral of optimal vacancies conditional on p˜ and
γca(c| p˜) is the density of vacancy posting costs c
v,0
a conditional on p˜, γa( p˜) is the marginal den-
sity of composite productivity p˜ and ∂w∗a( p˜)/∂ p˜ = w
∗
a
′( p˜) is the derivative of equilibrium wage
with respect to p˜. Thus, we can rewrite h′a( p˜) =
v∗a ( p˜)
Va
γ( p˜) by differentiating equation (27) using
Leibniz’s integral rule.
Using these identities, we can write fa(w∗a( p˜)) =
v∗a ( p˜)
Va
γa( p˜)∂ p˜/∂w∗a( p˜). Thus, we can rewrite
equation (25) as
∂w∗a( p˜)
∂ p˜
= ( p˜− w∗a)
2λea
δa + λGa + λ
e
a(1− ha( p˜))
v∗a( p˜)
Va
γa( p˜). (30)
Because the right-hand side of this expression is always positive for p˜ > φa, it follows that
∂w∗a( p˜)/∂ p˜ > 0, thus proving that equilibrium wage is increasing in p˜.
Step 2. That optimal wages w∗a are strictly increasing in productivity p and strictly increasing
(constant) in the Lagrange multiplier on the credit limit ψ follows from the definition of p˜.
A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The proof follows closely that in Morchio and Moser (2020). We first reformulate the firm’s
problem. Define p˜ = p 1+r
1+(1+ψ)r
, where ψ is the Lagrange multiplier on a firm’s credit constraint,
as in equation (13) of the main text. Expected profits per worker contacted by a firm is
pia( p˜,w) = ha(w)Ja( p˜,w),
where ha(w) is the acceptance probability and Ja( p˜,w) is the value of employing a worker to a
firmwith composite productivity p˜ providing wage w. Under the assumption that firmsmaximize
long-run profits, the value of employing a worker is simply
Ja( p˜,w) =
p˜− w
δa + λea(1− Fa(w))
=
( p˜− w) / (δa)
1+ κea (1− Fa (w))
,
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The acceptance probability for a firm offering w is
ha(w) =
ua + sea (1− ua)Ga (w)
ua + sea (1− ua)
=
δa + sea (λ
u
a )Ga (w) (δa + λ
u
a )
δa + sea (λ
u
a ) (δa + λ
u
a )
=
1+ seaκ
u
aGa (w) (1+ κ
u
a )
1+ seaκ
u
a (1+ κ
u
a )
=
1+ seaκ
u
a
[
Fa(w)
1+κea[1−Fa(w)]
]
(1+ κua )
1+ seaκ
u
a (1+ κ
u
a )
=
1+ κea [1− Fa (w)] + s
e
aκ
u
a Fa (w) (1+ κ
u
a ) [1+ κ
e
a [1− Fa (w)]]
[1+ seaκ
u
a (1+ κ
u
a )] [1+ κ
e
a [1− Fa (w)]]
,
where κua = λ
u
a/δa. Combining expressions, expected profits per contacted worker are
pi ( p˜,w) = h (w) J ( p˜,w)
=
{1+ κea [1− Fa (w)] + s
e
aκ
u
a Fa (w) (1+ κ
u
a ) [1+ κ
e
a [1− Fa (w)]]} ( p˜− w)
[1+ seaκ
u
a (1+ κ
u
a )] [1+ κ
e
a (1− Fa (w))]
2 (δa)
. (31)
Then the firm’s problem becomes
max
w,v
{pia ( p˜,w) vqa − ca (v)} .
Therefore, the optimal wage and vacancy policy functions satisfy
w∗a ( p˜, ·) = argmax
w
pia ( p˜,w)
∂ca (v∗ ( p˜, ·))
∂v
= max
w
pia ( p˜,w) . (32)
Since the vacancy cost function c (·) is convex, and pi ( p˜,w) in equation (31) is strictly increasing
in p˜, then it follows from an application of the envelope theorem to equation (32) that v∗ ( p˜, ·)
is strictly increasing in p˜. Therefore, v∗a(·) is strictly increasing in productivity p and strictly in-
creasing (constant) in the Lagrange multiplier on the credit constraint ψ for credit contsrained
(unconstrained) firms.
A.2.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The proof follows directly by combining Lemmas 1 and 2.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Consider the impact of a lower credit limit ξ j for all j. We proceed in two parts.
1. That within-firm inequality falls due to a tightening of the credit constraint is a direct con-
sequence of Lemma 1. The lemma states that wages of high-skill workers, waH , are strictly
increasing in ξ j among constrained firms but wages of low-skill workers, waL , are invariant
to ξ j. Therefore, a reduction in the credit limit ξ j for all firms strictly reduces the top-to-
bottom wage difference in all constrained firms, while leaving that in unconstrained firms
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unchanged.
2. Because all low-skill workers earn wages equal to their outside option, a firm’s mean wage
depends only on its relative employment of high-skill versus low-skill workers and the wage
it offers to high-skill workers. Lemma 1 already establishes that the latter is strictly increas-
ing in the credit ξ j among constrained firms. Under the assumption of fixed job offer arrival
rates {λua ,λ
e
a} for both a, worker composition is independent of firms’ credit constraints.
Note that the firm with the lowest composite productivity p˜j, which is ranked lowest in the
firm ladder, will offer the lowest acceptable wage to both worker types, namely waL = φaL
and waH = φaH . This is true before and after the change in credit conditions. And since
worker composition does not change by our assumption of fixed job offer arrival rates, the
mean wage at the lowest-paying firm is also invariant to credit. Therefore, the top-to-bottom
difference in mean wages between firms decreases, and strictly so if at least some firms are
credit constrained.
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B Empirical Appendix
B.1 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Effects ofMonetary Policy-Induced Credit Supply Shock onWithin-Firm Inequality:
Nonexecutive Board Members
ln(p50 board total/p5) ln(p50 board salary/p5) ln(p50 board bonus/p5)
Sample DAX firms DAX firms DAX firms
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Deposit ratio × After(2014) -0.514 -0.106 -0.295
(0.632) (0.672) (1.450)
Firm FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
N 264 264 105
Notes: The unit of observation is the firm-year level jt. In column 1, the sample consists of all German corporations j
in year t from 2010 to 2017. The sample consists of DAX-listed German corporations j in year t from 2010 to 2016 for
which we have board-compensation data from BoardEx. The dependent variable in column 1 is the delta log of the
median total compensation of nonexecutive board members at firm j in year t versus the annualized wage at the 5th
percentile of firm j’s wage distribution in year t. The dependent variable in column 2 is the delta log of the median
salary of nonexecutive board members at firm j in year t versus the annualized wage at the 5th percentile of firm j’s
wage distribution in year t. The dependent variable in column 3 is the delta log of the median bonus (conditional on
being nonzero) of nonexecutive board members at firm j in year t versus the annualized wage at the 5th percentile
of firm j’s wage distribution in year t. Deposit ratioj ∈ [0, 1] is the average deposits-to-assets ratio, measured in 2013,
across all (typically German) banks that firm j reports to be in a banking relationship with anytime from 2010 to 2013.
After(2014)t is an indicator variable for the years 2014–2016. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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